

Game Theory and Statistical Mechanics in the **Self-organizing** Dynamics of People, Birds, and Networks

Venkat Venkatasubramanian

Center for the Management of Systemic Risk

Department of Chemical Engineering

Columbia University

New York, NY 10027




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Self-organizing Dynamics and Emergent Order



Bacterial Chemotaxis



Ant Crater Formation



Birds flocking



Wikipedia

- Could there be **unifying** organizing principle(s) behind such **collective** behavior?
- Different species, different scales, different phenomena
- But nature generally uses only a **handful of tricks** in her design!
- In physics, it is **symmetry**!
- Key insight from physics: Look for **invariants**!



Reductionist Science

- 20th Century Science was largely **Reductionist**
 - Quantum Mechanics and Elementary Particle Physics
 - Molecular Biology, Double Helix, Sequencing Human Genome
 - **600+** Nobel Prizes



Wikipedia




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Complex Self-organizing Systems

- But can **reductionism** answer the following question?
- Given the properties of a **neuron**, can we **predict** the **collective behavior** of a system of 100 billion neurons?

Wikipedia




- From Neuron  Brain  Mind
- How do you go from **Parts to System**?

Reductionism cannot answer this!
There is nothing left to “reduce”!



From the **Parts** to the **Whole**: Statistical **Tele**odynamics

- **Individual** agent properties  **Emergent** properties of millions of agents
- Agents are **goal-free** (e.g., Molecules)  System (e.g., Gas)
 - **Statistical Thermodynamics**
- What if the agents are **goal-driven**?
 - e.g., neurons, bacteria, ants, birds, people
- Can we **generalize** statistical thermodynamics?
- Statistical **Thermodynamics** (goal-free agents)  Statistical **Tele**odynamics (goal-driven agents)
- **Telos** means **goal** in Greek



Self-organizing Emergent Phenomena

Biology

Ecology

Sociology

Economics



Self-organizing Dynamics in a Free Market

- People keep switching **jobs** to **increase** their **utility**
- Just like **drivers** keep switching **lanes** to **reduce** travel **time**
- Suddenly, a lane opens up – you **switch**!
- **Other** drivers also switch!
- Soon, the new lane is just as **slow**
- Drivers **stop** switching
 - Travel time is the **same** in all lanes
 - $t_1 = t_2 = t_3 = \dots = t^*$
- **Arbitrage Equilibrium**



Wikipedia



Self-organizing Dynamics in a Free Market

- Similarly, people **stop** switching jobs if there is **no** arbitrage opportunity to increase their **utility**
 - **Arbitrage Equilibrium**
- Every worker enjoys the **same effective utility**
 - $h_{ij} = h^*$
- Is there an income distribution with **constant h^*** ?
- Can the **free market** find it via the **self-organizing dynamics**?



Behavioral Microeconomics Model: Effective Utility

- What is the **utility** of a job?
- It is a **complicated** function depending on a number of variables and parameters
- But for most people it's dominated by **two pragmatic** features
 - Pay bills **now**
 - Path for a better **future** and **upward mobility**
- Simple **behavioral** economics-like model: **Ideal gas**-like
- **Effective** utility (h_{ij}) of agent j at salary level i
 - Utility from **income** (u_{ij})
 - Disutility from **contribution** (v_{ij})
 - Utility of **future** prospects (w_{ij})

$$h_{ij} = u_{ij} - v_{ij} + w_{ij}$$




Modeling u_{ij}

- Utility from income
- Diminishing marginal utility

$$u_{ij} = \alpha_j \ln S_i$$




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Modeling v_{ij}



- Net benefit u_{net}
Utility from Income (u) - Disutility of Effort (v)
- u_{net} initially **increases** as u increases
- However, it begins to **decrease** soon due to the **increasing cost** of personal sacrifices
 - Working overtime
 - Missing time with family
 - Job stress causing poor health
 - Relocation



$$u_{net} = u - v = au - bu^2$$

$$\text{Since } u_{ij} \sim \ln S_i$$

$$v_{ij} = \beta_j (\ln S_i)^2$$



Utility of Future Prospects w_{ij}

- N_i - Number of employees **competing** for partnership worth $\$Q$ in the future
- Employee's chance of winning: $1/N_i$
- Expected Value: Q/N_i
- Utility (w_i): $\ln(Q/N_i)$
- **Cost of competition**



$$w_{ij} = -\gamma_j \ln N_i$$



Effective Utility of Agents

- Effective Utility h_{ij} of agent j at salary level i

$$h_{ij} = u_{ij} - v_{ij} + w_{ij}$$

$$h_{ij} = \alpha_j \ln S_i - \beta_j (\ln S_i)^2 - \gamma_j \ln N_i$$



- $\alpha_j, \beta_j, \gamma_j$ are parameters that **weight** an agent j 's **utility preferences**
- Can vary from agent to agent
- **Assumption: Same** for all agents - **1-class** society, Utopia - **Ideal Gas**

$$h_i = \alpha \ln S_i - \beta (\ln S_i)^2 - \gamma \ln N_i$$

- Note that the **effective utility** already **accounts** for the **contribution** made by an agent



Population Games: For Large N

Potential Game

- N employees competing for jobs
- There exists a **potential** $\phi(\mathbf{x})$, s.t.



$$h_i(\mathbf{x}) \equiv \partial \phi(\mathbf{x}) / \partial x_i$$

where $x_i = N_i / N$

$$h_i = \alpha \ln S_i - \beta (\ln S_i)^2 - \gamma \ln N_i$$

$$\phi(\mathbf{x}) = \phi_u + \phi_v + \phi_w$$

$$\phi_u = \alpha \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \ln S_i$$

$$\phi_v = -\beta \sum_{i=1}^n x_i (\ln S_i)^2$$

$$\phi_w = \frac{\gamma}{N} \ln \frac{N!}{\prod_{i=1}^n (N x_i)!}$$



Is there an **Equilibrium** Distribution?

- There exists a **Nash Equilibrium**, when $\phi(\mathbf{x})$ is **maximized**
- NE is **unique** if the potential is strictly **concave**

$$\partial^2 \phi(\mathbf{x}) / \partial x_i^2 = -\gamma / x_i < 0$$



$$\begin{aligned}\phi_u &= \alpha \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \ln S_i \\ \phi_v &= -\beta \sum_{i=1}^n x_i (\ln S_i)^2 \\ \phi_w &= \frac{\gamma}{N} \ln \frac{N!}{\prod_{i=1}^n (N x_i)!}\end{aligned}$$

- But **what** is the equilibrium distribution?

Key insight: ϕ_w is **Entropy** in Statistical Mechanics




Thermodynamics as a Game of “Passive” Agents

$$h_i(E_i, N_i) = -\beta E_i - \ln N_i$$

$$\phi(\mathbf{x}) = -\frac{\beta}{N} E + \frac{1}{N} \ln \frac{N!}{\prod_{i=1}^n (N x_i)!}$$

$$L = \phi + \lambda(1 - \sum_{i=1}^n x_i). \quad \partial L / \partial x_i = 0$$

$$E = N \sum_{i=1}^n x_i E_i \quad \sum_{i=1}^n x_i = 1$$



Equilibrium: **Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution at Maximum Entropy**

$$x_i = \frac{\exp(-\beta E_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^n \exp(-\beta E_j)}$$

- Potential Game agrees with Statistical Mechanics in the **limiting case of purpose-free, agents, namely, molecules**
- Thermodynamic Equilibrium = **Nash Equilibrium**
- $\phi(\mathbf{x})$ is **Helmholtz Free Energy: Thermodynamic Potential**
- Molecular “Utility” h_i is similar to **Negative Chemical Potential**

Surprising & Deep Connection



Income Game



- N employees competing for jobs
- Nash Equilibrium exists at **maximum potential**
- Equilibrium distribution : **Lognormal**

$$x_i = \frac{1}{S_i Z} \exp \left[-\frac{\left(\ln S_i - \frac{\alpha + \gamma}{2\beta} \right)^2}{\gamma/\beta} \right]$$

- At equilibrium, all agents have the **same utility h^***
- **Fairest** distribution of income
- **Bottom-up** perspective: Parts-to-Whole
- Given the individual utility h_i

$$h_i = \alpha \ln S_i - \beta (\ln S_i)^2 - \gamma \ln N_i$$

- Can predict the **system-level outcome: Lognormal**



Predictions for Different Countries


- How does our theory perform in **practice**?
- Our theory estimates **lognormal-based income shares** for Top **1%**, Top **10-1%**, and Bottom **90%** for **ideally fair** societies

$$\text{Non-ideal Inequality Coefficient } \psi = \frac{\text{Actual share}}{\text{Ideal share}} - 100\%$$

$$\psi = 0 \text{ *Fairest Inequality*; } \psi \neq 0 \text{ *Unfair Inequality*}$$




Norway: Non-ideal Inequality ψ



Norway: Non-ideal Inequality ψ

ψ



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
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
Norway: Non-ideal Inequality ψ

ψ



Norway: Non-ideal Inequality ψ

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
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
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USA: Non-ideal Inequality ψ






(a)

(b)


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(d)

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
(f)



(g)

(h)

(i)




**Ideal Inequality Line
at 0%**
**Pre-tax Labor
Income Data**




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Statistical Teleodynamics of Biological Active Matter




Birds Flocking:

Agents-based Simulation




Time : 0, n : 80.300000, a : 0.014228, h: -4.335696 (+/-0.332228)



$\alpha, \beta, \gamma = 0$

Time : 0, n : 81.482000, a : 0.016892, h: 3.943738 (+/-19.071987)



$\alpha, \beta, \gamma \neq 0$

- Darwinian **survival** instinct
- Effective Utility


$$h_i = \alpha n_i - \beta n_i^2 + \gamma \sum_j n_{ij} \mathbf{s}_i \cdot \mathbf{s}_j - \delta \ln n_i$$

Company Congestion j Coherence Competition

Ideal gas model
Ising model







- **VV**, Sivaram, and Das, "A unified theory of emergent equilibrium phenomena in active and passive matter", *Comp. & Chem. Engg.*, **2022**.
- Sivaram and **VV**, "Arbitrage Equilibrium, Invariance, and the Emergence of Spontaneous Order in the Dynamics of Birds Flocking", *Arxiv*, **2022**.

Arbitrage Equilibrium – h^*



- **VV**, Sivaram, and Das, “A unified theory of emergent equilibrium phenomena in active and passive matter”, *Comp. & Chem. Engg.*, **2022**.
- Sivaram and **VV**, “Arbitrage Equilibrium, Invariance, and the Emergence of Spontaneous Order in the Dynamics of Birds Flocking”, *Entropy*, **2022**.

Arbitrage Equilibrium is Asymptotically Stable



- Randomly reset the velocities at time step 101
- System self-heals automatically!
- Could this be a core mechanism of self-healing and resilience in other biological systems?

Lyapunov function (V)


$$V(\mathbf{x}) = \phi^*(\mathbf{x}) - \phi(\mathbf{x})$$

$\dot{V}$ is *negative definite*.

Asymptotically Stable

Theory of Deep Neural Networks

- A gas container has $\sim 10^{23}$ molecules interacting dynamically.
- The theory of predicting the macroscopic properties of a gas given the microscopic properties of its molecules is called statistical mechanics.
- Similarly, what is such a theory of deep neural networks with millions of neurons and billions of connections?
- Theory should answer questions such as
 - What is the distribution of weights in a trained network?
 - What is the distribution of neuronal activity?



Theory of Deep Neural Networks

- Hopfield model and Boltzmann machine **cannot** answer these questions!
- Backprop algorithm **cannot** answer either.
- These are **not theories** of deep neural networks.
- They are algorithmic **recipes** for training networks.
- They are like having **molecular dynamics** algorithms, periodic boundary conditions, and other such tricks to simulate the system **without knowing the laws of thermodynamics**.



Theory of Deep Neural Networks

- So, what are the laws of neural networks?
- This is the question I had asked myself in 1982 before hearing Hopfield's talk at Cornell.
- After his talk, I felt intuitively that he was on the right track, but his formulation was not quite correct.
- So, I went on to develop the correct formulation.
- It took me 42 years and I finally found the correct formulation this year!
- I call the new formulation the Jaynes Machine.



Edwin T. Jaynes
1922-1998



Jaynes Machine

- Hopfield and Hinton looked to physics for inspiration
 - Ising model
 - Minimize Energy
 - Statistical Thermodynamics
- I looked to game theory and economics
 - Potential games
 - Maximize Utility
 - Statistical Teleodynamics
- Neurons and connections compete during training



Theory of Deep Neural Networks: Statistical Teleodynamics


- Each **connection** contributes an **effective utility** towards **error** minimization

$$h_{ijk}^l = \alpha^l \ln |w_{ijk}^l| - \beta^l (\ln |w_{ijk}^l|)^2 - \ln M_k^l$$

- Arbitrage equilibrium: $h_{ijk}^l = h^*$
- Lognormal distribution of weights

$$x_k^l = \frac{1}{|w_{ijk}^l| \sigma^l \sqrt{2\pi}} \exp \left[-\frac{(\ln |w_{ijk}^l| - \mu^l)^2}{2\sigma^{l2}} \right]$$

$$\mu^l = \frac{\alpha^l + 1}{2\beta^l} \text{ and } \sigma^l = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2\beta^l}}.$$





VV., Sanjeevrajan, N., Khandekar, M., Sivaram, A., and Szczepanski, C., "Jaynes machine: The universal microstructure of deep neural networks," *Comp. & Chem. Engg.*, 192, 108908, 2025.



Deep Neural Networks:

6 Case Studies – 798 layers

Model	Architecture	Parameters size	Application
BlazePose	Convolution	2.8×10^6	Computer Vision
Xception	Convolution	20×10^6	Computer Vision
BERT Small	Transformer	109×10^6	Natural Language Processing
BERT Large	Transformer	325×10^6	Natural Language Processing
LLAMA-2 (7B)	Transformer	7×10^9	Natural Language Processing
LLAMA-2 (13B)	Transformer	13×10^9	Natural Language Processing



Lognormal!

Same σ !

Model	Layers	R^2	A'	μ'	σ'
BlazePose	39	0.93 ± 0.02	3.75 ± 2.09	-1.74 ± 0.52	1.49 ± 0.60
Xception	32	0.98 ± 0.01	6.53 ± 3.64	-2.87 ± 0.18	0.70 ± 0.05
BERT Small	75	0.96 ± 0.01	66.15 ± 46.46	-2.47 ± 0.95	0.65 ± 0.02
BERT Large	144	0.96 ± 0.01	44.84 ± 143.6	-2.37 ± 0.98	0.64 ± 0.01
LLAMA-2 (7B)	226	0.97 ± 0.01	11464 ± 8170	-2.96 ± 0.54	0.66 ± 0.05
LLAMA-2 (13B)	282	0.94 ± 0.03	1513 ± 1116	-3.02 ± 0.53	0.67 ± 0.06

Derive Hopfield Network and Boltzmann Machine as a special case of Jaynes Machine

- Neuronal lotum

$$Z_i^l = z_i^l y_i^l = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N^{(l-1)}} w_{ij}^l y_j^{l-1} + b_i^l \right) y_i^l$$

- Jaynes neuronal utility

$$H^{l*} = \eta \ln Z_q^l - \zeta (\ln Z_q^l)^2 - \ln N_q^{l*}$$

- Jaynes neuronal potential

$$\text{Max } \Phi_N = \sum_{l=1}^L \phi_N^l = \sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{q=1}^n \left[\eta x_q^l \ln Z_q^l - \zeta x_q^l (\ln Z_q^l)^2 \right] + \mathcal{S}_N$$

- Hopfield utility

$$H^{l*} = B^l - \zeta Z_q^l - \ln N_q^{l*}$$

- Hopfield potential

$$\text{Max } \Phi_N = -\zeta \sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{i=1}^{N^l} Z_i^l + \mathcal{S}_N$$

- Hopfield “energy”

$$\text{Min } \sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{i=1}^{N^l} Z_i^l = \text{Min } \sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{i=1}^{N^l} \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N^{(l-1)}} w_{ij}^l y_j^{l-1} y_i^l + b_i^l y_i^l \right)$$



Laws of Statistical Teleodynamics

First Law: A large system of competing **goal-driven** agents will dynamically **evolve** such that all agents will continuously strive to achieve **maximum effective utility** allowed by the **constraints** imposed by their operating **environment**.

Second Law: The system will reach an **arbitrage equilibrium** when the system's **potential ϕ is maximized**.

These two laws are **generalizations** of the thermodynamic laws for **goal-driven** agents.

This is what I was seeking in **1982**! Found it in **2024**!

$$\text{Max } \Phi_N = \sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{q=1}^n \left[\eta x_q^l \ln Z_q^l - \zeta x_q^l (\ln Z_q^l)^2 \right] + \mathcal{S}_N$$

“Negative Gibbs Free Energy”
- G = - E + TS

**Hopfield &
Boltzmann Machine**

$$\text{Min } \sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{i=1}^{N^l} Z_i^l$$

Ising model




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Equilibrium in Active Matter



- Passive matter

- Forces are equal



Mechanical Equilibrium

- Temperatures are equal



Thermal Equilibrium

- Chemical potentials are equal



Phase Equilibrium

- Active matter has a new equilibrium

- Effective utilities are equal



Arbitrage Equilibrium



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Is there a **Unifying** Self-organizing Principle?

Nature uses only the **longest** threads to weave her patterns, so that each **small** piece of her fabric **reveals** the **organization** of the **entire** tapestry.

Richard P. Feynman

- **Maximum utility**-driven **Arbitrage Equilibrium** could be such a thread.
- Could be the **unifying principle** in the **self-organization** and emergent behavior of active matter.
- This is what **Adam Smith** called the **Invisible Hand**!



Wikipedia



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Flocking of birds, Mussels, Social segregation

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Deep neural networks

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Questions?



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