

# Analyzing Socio-Economic Phenomena using Physics

## III. Financial Markets: Dynamics

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
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# Inferring causal relation between stocks

Cross correlations with time-delay  $\tau$ :

$$C_{\Delta t}^{A,B}(\tau) = \frac{\langle r_{\Delta t}^A(t) r_{\Delta t}^B(t + \tau) \rangle - \langle r_{\Delta t}^A(t) \rangle \langle r_{\Delta t}^B(t + \tau) \rangle}{\sigma_A \sigma_B}$$

Time-delay correlation betn Ensco Intl (ESV) and Exxon Corp (XON)



Max correlation at  $\sim 100$  s

$\Rightarrow$  Return time series of ESV has to be shifted back in order to get the maximal correlation

Price change of ESV seems to follow XON with a time lag  $\sim 100$  s

$\Rightarrow$  **ESV is “pulled” by XON.**

# NYSE




## Network showing significant “pulling effect” between companies

# Is the Market a Dynamical System ?

Knowing the extent of influence that movement of one stock can exert on another can help in writing a dynamical system description of the market

E.g., if  $r_i$  is return of  $i$ -th stock at a time instant, can the time-evolution of the market be written as a system of  $N$  equations:  
$$dr_i / dt = F_i (c_{i1} r_1, c_{i2} r_2, \dots, c_{ii} r_i, \dots, c_{iN} r_N) ?$$



In efficient markets, we expect  $c_{ii} \approx 0$

**Puzzle:**

Auto-correlation of returns decay within minutes

Why do significant cross-correlations (eigenvalues of  $C$  deviating from the bulk predicted by RMT) persist even after days ?

# Is the Market stable ?


Having formulated the behavior of markets as general (nonlinear) dynamical systems,  
we can ask: **Are the attractors of market dynamics stable ?**  
**Will small perturbations from an equilibrium decay or grow ?**

For example, will a small drop in price of stock A be quickly corrected or result in a change in the price of stocks B and C that are “pulled” by A, and eventually cascade to the rest of the market ?

Existence of cycles in such a network of interactions will cause the initially small perturbation to keep growing with time and result in large deviations of the market from its previous eqblm

**This question is applicable to markets in more general contexts !**

# (Ir)rational Exuberance ?!



Stock price and  
company  
earnings don't  
match

Prices much  
higher than  
warranted by  
fundamentals

Bubbles: No indication of specific change in fundamentals to account for precipitous rise/fall of stock prices

# **A Brief History of Financial “Madness”**



Semper Augustus bulb  
Sold for 2000 Guilders (\$ 16,000) in 1625

1636: rapid price increase  
attracts speculators

Nov 1636 - Jan 1637: prices  
surge upward spectacularly

Feb 1637: prices suddenly  
collapse


# Tulipomania

Holland, 1634-1637

At the peak, a single tulip bulb traded for an entire estate...

... at the bottom, tulip bulb sold at the price of a common onion.

Bubble persisted despite public warnings that it was unsustainable







John Law


Rapid expansion through corporate takeovers and acquisition of government debts – financed by successive issues of shares

# The Mississippi Scheme

## France, 1719-1720

Share prices collapsed from 10,000 livres in Jan 1720 to 500 livres in Sep 1721

Mississippi Bubble Money and Price Data



Aug 1717: Law organizes Compagnie d'Occident, issues stocks

May 1719: After successive acquisitions, the entire conglomerate reorganized as Compagnie des Indes with monopoly of all French trade outside Europe

Jan 1720: share prices begin to fall because of increasing attempts to convert capital gains to gold; payments above 100 livres prohibited

Sep 1720: share price falls to 2000 livres



Hogarth's satiric caricature of the South Sea craze

# The South Sea Bubble

*Contemporary of the French Mississippi Scheme*

England, 1720

Share prices collapsed from about 1000 Pounds in July 1720 to about 200 Pounds in October 1720

Jan : South Sea Company launches plan to acquire British govt debt


April : To finance their operations, the Company offers shares; onset of speculation ...

... that triggers simultaneous upsurge in price of other companies; creation of "bubble companies"

Aug : Bubble Act bans unauthorized ventures; scramble to sell off stocks

Sep: Market value of all shares fall by 63% in one month

South Sea Shares



# Modern day bubbles and crashes

- 1926: Florida Real Estate craze
- Sep-Oct 1929: The Great Wall Street Crash  
Market dropped by 40% within 2 months
- Oct 19, 1987: Black Monday
- 1989-2003: Asian Crises

# The Dot Com Bubble

March 2000-Oct 2002


The NASDAQ composite lost 78 % of its value as it fell from 5046.86 to 1114.11

1995 onwards: excitement about the new “information economy”


*typical investor sentiment :*  
“no limits to growth”

1999: Out of 457 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), 117 doubled in price on first day of trading

2001: Only 76 IPOs; none showed such spectacular price rise on beginning trading




# Bubbles in Indian markets



The “Big Bull” Bubble  
early 1992

The “Dot-Com” Bubble  
2000-2002






# Are Agents Irrational ?!

Why don't people learn from their mistakes ?

Is it possible that bubbles may arise as a collective effect from every agent pursuing a rational course of action ?



Can apparently irrational behavior arise through interaction between rational agents ?

**Example:** Let each agent  $i$  in a market be specified by its probability to choose one of two possible options (say *Buy*),  $p_i$

Assumption: the stable equilibrium state for all agents is  $p = 1/2$ , i.e.,

$$dp_i/dt = \alpha (1/2 - p_i)$$

$\Rightarrow$  In the absence of interactions, the system is balanced, i.e., neither excess buyers nor excess sellers

Now, allow interactions between agents

$$dp_i/dt = \alpha (1/2 - p_i) + f \left( \sum_j J_{ij} [p_j - 1/2] \right)$$

Equivalently:  $dx_i/dt = -\alpha x_i + f \left( \sum_j J_{ij} x_j \right)$

**Question:**

Is the equilibrium  $X = \{0, 0, 0, \dots, 0\}$  stable under interactions between agents ?

# Complex Markets are Unstable !

As the interaction between agents increase in complexity

- the connections density increases, and/or
- interactions become stronger,

the system *almost certainly* becomes unstable.

i.e., although each agent individually prefers a balanced state (individual rationality), interactions would lead to a state with excess buyers or sellers (collective irrationality) !

This conclusion follows from the **May-Wigner Theorem** on Instability of Complex Networks



# Stability of large networks

State of the network of  $N$  nodes:  $N$ -dimensional vector  $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N)$ ,

$x_i$ : state of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  node.

Time evolution of  $x$  is given by a set of equations  $dx_i/dt = f_i(x)$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$ )

Fixed point equilibrium of the dynamics:  $x^0 = (x^0_1, x^0_2, \dots, x^0_N)$  such that  $f(x^0) = 0$

Local stability of  $x^0$ : Linearizing about the eqblm:  $\delta x = x - x^0$

$d\delta x/dt = A \delta x$  where Jacobian  $A$ :  $A_{ij} = \partial f_i / \partial x_j |_{x=x^0}$

Long time behavior of  $\delta x$  dominated by  $\lambda_{\max}$  (largest real part of the eigenvalues of  $A$ )

$|\delta x| \sim \exp(\lambda_{\max} t)$

The equilibrium  $x = x^0$  is stable if  $\lambda_{\max} < 0$ .

What is the probability that for a network,  $\lambda_{\max} < 0$ ?

Each node is independently stable  $\Rightarrow$  diagonal elements of  $A < 0$  (choose  $A_{ii} = -1$ ).

Let  $A = B - I$  where  $B$  is a matrix with diagonal elements 0 and  $I$  is  $N \times N$  identity matrix.

For matrix  $B$ , the question: What is the probability that  $\lambda'_{\max} < 1$ ?

# Applying Random Matrix Theory:

Simplest approximation: **No particular structure** in the matrix  $B$ ,  
i.e.,  $B$  is a random matrix.

$B$  has **connectance**  $C$ , i.e.,  $B_{ij} = 0$  with probability  $1 - C$ .

Non-zero elements: i.i.d. random variables from  $\text{Normal}(0, \sigma^2)$  distribution.  
For large  $N$ , **Wigner's theorem** for random matrices apply.

Largest real part of the eigenvalues of  $B$  is  $\lambda'_{\max} = \sqrt{N C \sigma^2}$ .

For eigenvalues of  $A$ :  $\lambda_{\max} = \lambda'_{\max} - 1$

For large  $N$ , probability of stability  $\rightarrow 0$  if  $\sqrt{N C \sigma^2} > 1$ ,  
while, the system is **almost surely stable** if  $\sqrt{N C \sigma^2} < 1$ .

Large systems exhibit **sharp transition** from stable to unstable behavior when  $N$   
or  $C$  or  $\sigma^2$  exceeds a critical value.


**$\Rightarrow$  Complexity  $\rightarrow$  Instability**

# Criticism of May-Wigner theorem :


## Complexity → Instability

- ❑ Assumes **random** network of interactions  
But real life networks are structured !


- ❑ Solution: Consider networks which have structures in the arrangement of their interactions, e.g.,



Regular Network  
 $p = 0$



"Small-world" Network  
 $0 < p < 1$



Random Network  
 $p = 1$

Increasing Randomness

Watts and Strogatz (1998): Many biological, technological and social networks have connection topologies that lie between the two extremes of completely regular and completely random.


## Question:

Does WS small-world topology affect stability of a network ?

**Answer: NO!** (SS 2005)

Probability of stability in a network


Finite size scaling:  $N = 200, 400, 800$  and  $1000$ .



Regular vs Random Networks

The eigenvalue plain

The stability-instability transition occurs at the same critical value as random network ....  
**but** transition gets sharper with randomness



$N = 1000, C = 0.021, \sigma = 0.206$

## Networks with structure:

### Complexity → Instability

Similar results for correlated *scale-free networks* – disassortative networks relatively more stable than assortative networks

⇒ Introducing certain structures in the network topology does not change the fact that :

Introducing sufficiently large complexity in a network (high connectivity or strong interactions between agents) would lead to instabilities in the system !


The implications of

**Complexity → Instability**


extend beyond the dynamical stability of a single financial market

⇒ As the economic world gets even more densely and strongly inter-connected, the risk of catastrophic, system-wide deviations increases !

# The International Financial Network



Was the current financial crisis a disaster just waiting to happen ?  
Network susceptibility to small perturbations resulting in a cascading process due to excessive connectivity ?



K Soramaki


## Fedwire interbank payment network

The core of the network consisting of 66 banks accounting for 75% of daily transactions in value (900 billion USD) – subset of 25 banks fully connected !



# Is the World Economy becoming too complex ?


The World Trade Web  
(c. 1400) centered on  
Silk Route/Indian Ocean



The World Trade Web (2000)  
showing the strongest 4% links in  
terms of volume of annual trade

$4 \times 10^5$  MS

$2 \times 10^3$  MS



S S Manna



# Conclusions

- ❑ Delayed cross-correlation analysis provides a mean of identifying the directed network of (possibly causally related) interactions among stocks
- ❑ This opens up the possibility to analyze markets as dynamical systems and ask questions about the overall stability of market equilibria
- ❑ May-Wigner theorem: As complexity of the network of interactions increases, stability to perturbations decreases
- ❑ Will events like the current financial/economic crisis become more frequent in a world that is getting more and more strongly connected ?