Introduction to Cryptography

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Cryptography in Epigraphy

- A writing system is a notational system for a language, various categories based on phonetics and semantics
- Decipherment refers to the process of determination of the symbol system behind the unknown script or text
- Four types of decipherments based on known / unknown language and writing system
- Many challenges: reading direction, unknown punctuation, small dataset, incomplete vocabulary, etc

- Review of historical alphabets
- Statistical analysis on single characters
- Statistical analysis of N-grams
- "Encrypted epigraphy the case of a mysterious inscription in the Neapolitan church of Santa Maria La Nova" by Cosimo Palma

Introduction

TLS Security

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Cryptology is the study and practice of techniques for secure communications in the presence of adversary.

\$ It is derived from Greek words "kryptos" meaning hidden or secret and "logia" meaning study

Cryptology comprises of:

- Cryptography Design of secure systems
- Cryptanalysis Analyzing or breaking such systems

\$Is very ancient and has found mention in various scriptures.

♣Very important in defence, banking, governance, etc.

In 1883 Auguste Kerckhoffs wrote two journal articles on La Cryptographie Militaire, in which he stated six design principles laid down for military ciphers.

In modern cryptologic parlance, it is stated as: A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.

The same was stated by Claude Shannon as follows: The enemy knows the system.

Using cryptology, we hope to achieve

- Confidentiality No third party can read the message
- Authentication The sender knows that the receiver knows a particular private key
- Identification Binding between the private key and the individual
 - Trust Third party certifies that a particular private key belongs to a particular individual
- Integrity Messages are not corrupted during transit

Sender encrypts message using a key and sends through a public channel, which the receiver decrypts



The encryption and the decryption keys may not be the same



Provides perfect secrecy: Knowledge of the ciphertext has no bearing on the plaintext

- Does not ensure authentication
- ♣But impractical since
 - We need synchronized truly random bits
 - Key stream bits cannot be re-used

Symmetric Key Cryptography

Here the encryption and the decryption keys are essentially the sameSuch algorithms assume that the two parties have the same keyTwo broad class of primitives which provide data confidentiality

- 1. Stream Ciphers
- 2. Block Ciphers

Hash Functions are used to provide integrity and authentication

Encrypts blocks of message bits

&Usually a iterated cipher

&KSA provides the round keys







S-boxes for providing non-linearity and linear layer for diffusion of bits. Also key dependence is present.

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

Feistel



Left and right parts

Non-linear function which is key dependent

&DES: Data Encryption Standard

Encrypts message bits by XOR-ing with pseudorandom bits

- Pseudorandom bits are generated using shift registers
- Notice similarity with OTP
- & Examples:Salsa and SNOW
- Two types of stream ciphers
 - 1. Synchronous The pseudorandom bits are generated independently of plaintext and ciphertext bits
 - 2. Self-synchronizing The pseudorandom bits are dependent on plaintext and ciphertext bits



SHA family: Secure Hash Algorithm

Must have the following properties:

- 1. Pre-image resistance
- 2. Second pre-image resistance
- 3. Collision resistance

- 1. One of the more popular ways to construct a MAC is to use a block cipher in CBC mode with a fixed (public) initialization vector
- 2. In CBC mode, each ciphertext block y_i is XOR-ed with the next plaintext block, x_{i+1} , before being encrypted with the secret key K
- 3. Let $y_0 = IV$. Construct subsequent ciphertext blocks

$$y_i = e_K(y_{i-1} \oplus x_i)$$

4. Basically, we "encrypt" the plaintext in CBC mode and we only retain the last ciphertext block, which we define to be the tag

- 1. Ciphertext only:attacker, with access only to ciphertexts, has to find one of the messages and / or the key
- 2. Known plaintexts: attacker is given many plaintext ciphertext pairs and has to find the plaintext for a new ciphertext
- 3. Chosen plaintexts: Attacker chooses plaintexts and gets the corresponding ciphertexts; the attacker has to find the key or the plaintext corresponding to a new ciphertext

Public Key Cryptography

Key Distribution: Storage and management of large number of secret keys

A Key Distribution Centre can be used, but inapplicable in the case of open systems

Attack on the KDC breaks the system

#If KDC breaks down secure communication is not possible

&Use public key systems to overcome these shortcomings

&Let $G = \{1 = g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{l-1}\}$. This satisfies $g^l = 1$. There is an underlying composition.

&Example: $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, m-1\}$ under addition modulo *m*.

&Example: $\{1, 2, ..., p-1\}$ under multiplication modulo *p*. The set of non-zero elements of a finite field forms a cyclic group under multiplication.

Discrete Log: Given g and $h = g^{\ell}$, find that ℓ . We want such structures where this problem is computationally hard.

Diffie Hellman: Given $g, h_1 = g^a, h_2 = g^b$ computing g^{ab} is hard.

DH Key Exchange

Input: Security parameter 1ⁿ

- Alice runs the setup algorithm $\mathcal{G}(1^n)$ to obtain G, q, g
- Alice uniformly chooses $x \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computes $h_A = g^x$
- Alice sends (G, q, g, h_A) to Bob
- Bob receives the tuple and parses it. He uniformly chooses y ∈_R Z_q and computes h_B = g^y. Bob sends h_B to Alice and computes k_B = h^y_A
- Alice receives h_B and computes $k_A = h_B^{\times}$

Verify that $k_A = h_B^{\scriptscriptstyle X} = (g^{\scriptscriptstyle Y})^{\scriptscriptstyle X} = (g^{\scriptscriptstyle X})^{\scriptscriptstyle Y} = h_A^{\scriptscriptstyle Y} = k_B$

Setup. Let $\mathcal{F}_p^* = \langle \alpha \rangle$. Then *a* is chosen at random and set $\beta = (\alpha)^a$ (mod *p*). Set $P = (p, \alpha, \beta)$ and S = a.

Encrypt(x). Choose k at random. Set

$$e(x,P) = y = (\alpha^k \pmod{p}, x\beta^k \pmod{p})$$

Decrypt(y). For $y = (y_1, y_2)$, define

$$d(y,S) = y_2(y_1^a)^{-1} \pmod{p}$$

Under the assumption that discrete log problem is hard, it is infeasible to break the ElGamal cryptosystem.

Authentication: Motivation for Using Digital Sigantures

- Plays a very vital role in a PKI
- Software updates, such that
 - any client can verify that the update is authentic
 - no malicious third party can fool a client into accepting a spurious update
- **&** To achieve this, the company can do the following:

Software Authentication

- Generate a public key-secret key pair and distribute its public key to every client (bundles with the original software)
- When releasing an update m, the company can compute a signature σ using its secret key and send (m, σ) to every client. The client verifies that σ is a genuine signature on m using the company's public key. Accepts the update when the signature is genuine.

Definition

A digital signature scheme S consists of three poly-time algorithms (*Gen*, *Sign*, *Vrfy*) such that:

- The key generation *Gen* is a PPT algorithm which takes as input the security parameter 1ⁿ and outputs the public key-secret key pair (*pk*, *sk*) of length *n*.
- 2. The signing Sign is a PPT algorithm which computes $\sigma = Sign(sk, m)$.
- 3. The verification Vrfy is a deterministic algorithm which outputs a bit $b = Vrfy(Pk, m, \sigma)$.

It is required that, for every legal message b = 1 holds.

If there exists a function ℓ such that the message space is $\{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ for every output of *Gen*, then *S* is said to be a signature scheme for messages of length $\ell(n)$.

Thank You