With a recent address by Pope John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences acknowledging that the scientific theory of evolution is more than a mere hypothesis, the Catholic Church has begun to officially come to terms with Darwin, just as it had done with Galileo a few years ago.
This grudging admission by the Catholic Church of the validity of science while seeking to safeguard essential aspects of its claim to a privileged understanding of man's role in nature, highlights the dilemma of religion particularly in this century.
As never before, the advance of science today directly challenges all religious belief. As science sets about providing answers to deep questions like the origin of life and the history of the universe, it sweeps aside the claims of religion to certain knowledge in these areas based on divine or mystic revelation. The answers that science provides give no room for belief in the existence of a interventionist God, who cares about human affairs; there is no sign of the existence of any divine plan behind the structure of the universe nor any special role in nature for living beings with consciousness. All that is revealed, as Steven Weinberg puts it, is ``the chilling impersonality of the laws of nature''.
Together with cosmology, the theory of evolution has been particularly damaging to the religious world-view. The work of Charles Darwin and Russell Wallace removed man from any special place in the development of life and placed him in a long continuum of biological evolution. The subsequent discovery of the structure of DNA and the advances in molecular biology have demolished the possiblity of any deep distinction between living and non-living matter.
In recent times few have done more to drive home these implications of Darwinian theory and the molecular understanding of life than Richard Dawkins. In a manner comparable to Thomas Huxley in his day, Dawkins has been a forceful proponent of the view that Darwinism and evolutionary theory leave no room for a God or a creator, and that there is nothing in evolution that points to a "plan" behind Nature.
In his latest book, "River Out of Eden" Dawkins returns to his basic theme, explaining the power of what he refers to as the ``Darwinian principle''. It is a theme whose several aspects he has explored before at greater length, in his earlier best-sellers "The Selfish Gene" and "The Blind Watchmaker". But in this relatively short, powerfully written book, Dawkins puts it all together in one connected story, that begins with the origins of life on Earth and ends with an attempt at placing it in an extraterrestrial context.
Dawkins begins with summarising the basics of evolution in genetic terms, using in an important way the insight provided by digital information theory. The digital nature of the genetic code, Dawkins emphasises, is essential to the fact that genes can copy themselves over several generations with remarkable accuracy, except for occassional mutations, that natural selection either weeds out or preserves. Dawkins points out that evolution is like a flow of genes and DNA through time, the "river" of the title of the book, that slowly branches out into the vast number of variations that are seen today.
It is this flow of genes, going back not less than 3000 million years, that is the fundamental feature of evolution and not the evolution of bodies. Bodies are the vehicles by which these replicators propogate; they provide the environment in which a gene survives together with many others. Dawkins illustrates the point by showing how this helps in tracing back the "river" of human genetic material to the most recent common ancestor in the purely female line that all humans living today must have, the "Mitochondrial Eve".
Dawkins deals at length with two fundamental aspects of evolution whose incorrect understanding is at the heart of the religious viewpoint on evolution.
The basic reason for the appeal of ``creationism'', Dawkins points out, arises from the naive view that the complexity and beauty of nature is such that it is difficult to see it as the product of evolution. It seems complex biological structures must have arisen perfectly the first time around; in short, created.
Dawkins beautifully explains the issue with the example of the evolution of the eye, a classic example and one dealt with by Darwin himself. Firstly, the ``perfection'' of nature is an illusion; the eye in nature is by no means perfect and nature has worked out several varieties, which clearly implies that eyes have evolved. Secondly, the overall gradual nature of evolution is essential, a point that Darwin himself had stressed. It is the accumulation of several small changes, together with natural selection, which can in fact unerringly give rise to complexity; the probability of one large change hitting the target is in fact virtually non-existent. The time-scale of evolution provides enough time for such changes to occur. In fact, in the case of the eye, computer experiments suggest that the time actually required is quite short compared to the available time for evolution.
The second problem is the existence of a purpose or plan in evolution. Is there a "Why?" to evolution beyond the question of "How?"
Part of the question was answered by Darwin himself; purposeful design is an illusion and the true reason is natural selection. But Dawkins goes further and argues that the true driving force of evolution is the maximisation of gene or DNA survival. From the vast variety of behaviour patterns seen in the natural world, the only thing that truly explains all of it is the this principle.
The genes that survive, argues Dawkins using a wide variety of examples, are selected by maximising their survival even to the extent of influencing behaviour beyond the bodies in which they are carried. Nature, in fact, is not efficient. And by no means does Nature work towards common welfare, of species or other groupings. Apparent attributes like co-operation, altruism or beauty are all incidental, subservient to the central purpose of survival. Life, Dawkins emphasises, is not governed at the level of operation of evolutionary theory by any goal or purpose.
Small wonder then, that Dawkins is a major target of attack in "God, Chance and Necessity" by Keith Ward, who seeks to argue that modern scientific developments, particularly in cosmology and evolutionary biology, in fact point to the existence of God.
The book is quick to make the point at the outset that what is at issue is not the content of scientific investigations. All theists he affirms should support the spirit of enquiry of science. He is even prepared to agree in principle that science can only proceed from the assumption that all of nature is knowable. Ward's claim is that he is taking issue not with science as such, but only with an atheistic interpretation of science that denies any validity to religious truth. Ward's attention is therefore directed to the writings of scientists who draw explicit attention to the atheist nature of their work.
Ward deals first with cosmology, in particular the books ``Creation Revisited'' by P. Atkins and Stephen Hawking's ``A Brief History of Time.'' Though both books deal with several speculative questions regarding cosmology and related issues, Ward does not appear to see the basic accepted scientific point that is being made. It is generally recognised in physics that any theory of gravity, extended to the very earliest times in the history of the universe, must eventually involve a breakdown of our current perceptions of the nature of space and time. In his defence of theism, Ward insists that space and time must have an apriori meaning.
Ward also opts for anthropocentric models of cosmology, that argue that our universe and its laws and the values of its physical constants are singled out by the emergence of intelligent life in it. Though the overall subject is quite speculative, these models do not represent by any means the last word in the subject. They are not even representative of the mainstream view-point.
Ward's last line of defence is mysticism. Despite his initial acceptance with the viewpoint that nature is completely knowable, Ward retreats to postulating a ``cosmic mind beyond speech and utterance , beyond duality and description...'' And `` that mind, from its infinite potency, selects the fundamental laws and limits of this universe,...''.
But Ward is really far more concerned with the implications of evolution. Natural selection is an illuminating idea, he concedes in the beginning, that explains many features of the biological world but no more. It is not a powerful explanatory principle, he insists, since it has no predictive power and cannot explain the emergence of complex life-forms or beings with consciousness.
In the end, it appears that the argument is directed actually against the theory of natural selection itself as understood by Darwin and others subsequently. If by natural selection one understands natural selection without any inherent bias towards the emergence of a rational agency, then, according to Ward, the hypothesis of theistic design is a equally good contender. Complexity cannot evolve through small, essentially random mutations combined with natural selection. Theistic design is the only ``theory'' that can explain the development of complex life-forms with consciousness.
Ward really reintroduces creationism by the back-door, invoking what Dawkins has referred to as ``The Argument of Design''. And, the evolution of man, a being with consciousness is sufficient proof for him of the purposiveness of evolution and the existence of a Creator. It is not even sufficient for Ward, while discussing evolution, to postulate a cosmic being who creates the universe and its laws and then lets it evolve on its own. God must intervene at various stages of the process in a purposive way and evolution is the working out of a life-plan.
Interestingly, Ward shops around in the realm of ``alternate science'' for ``holistic'' approaches to biology, that are not as ``reductionist'' as the Darwinian theory of evolution. He mentions approvingly a suggested theory of top-down causation in evolution whereby the whole influences the nature of its parts; for Ward the whole is readily indentified with God. He also approvingly mentions the Gaia hypothesis of Lovelock, which conceives of the Earth's biosphere as a single living organism. It is a hypothesis that has no place in a serious scientific discussion of evolutionary biology.
Ward's entire concern is to salvage a special role for consciousness, and hence the ``spirit'', a point of view very much shared by the Catholic Church in its recent statements. In doing so, he entirely misses the point that no successful theory explains all phenomena immediately. There remains a long period of explaining and extending the scope such a theory. While no doubt Darwinian theory is basically overwhelmingly successful, the emergence of consciousness is definitely a major unsolved problem. But to resort to ``theism'' is not the solution. The task of science is to proceed to eventually explain what is not currently understood, without the invoking of external spiritual agencies.
It is clear that Ward in the end fails to maintain the distinction between science and materialism that he had promised. Theism, it appears, cannot be defended without debating the content of science itself. Theism is falsifiable, insists Ward, and is therefore forced to defend it by attacking specific scientific concepts or aspects of scientific theories.
It is interesting to find that Ward's objections to evolutionary theory have their roots not in the problem of understanding nature but in the question of the origin of ethical values and morality. For Ward, there is a need to have a notion of absolute values, which are God-given, and consequently a need to establish that nature, being created by God, reflects these values. Any suggestion that there is no such lesson to be drawn from nature is completely unacceptable.
There is an obvious corollary of the scientific conclusion that the working of Nature is not governed by any ``human'' values like truth, beauty or altruism. Notions of ethics and morality and religion itself are in the ultimate analysis constructed by human beings themselves. This is a point that Dawkins and others have made repeatedly and one that Ward steadfastly ignores throughout the book.
Ward undoubtedy might appear to some as someone different from the Bible-thumping evangelist who demands equal time for ``creationism'' in schools. This perhaps is not wholly untrue, as the distinction is of some utility in practice in the defence of scientific education. But, despite the apparent sophistication of a non-literal reading of the idea of genesis from scriptural texts, there does not really appear in the end any essential philosophical distinction between his arguments and those of the ``creationist'' variety.
One might be tempted to dismiss the debate between science and
religion as of marginal importance to science. And to argue that in
the realm of ethics and morality the position of a believer is as true
or valid as that of anyone else, irrespective of whether he believes
in a natural world ordained by God or not. But in recent times,
ethical concerns arising from scientific advances in biology,
particularly human biology and the environment, some of which raise
questions that do not have easy answers, have shown that such clean
separations between the concerns of science and religion are not
really possible. Whether our response to such questions is to be based
on what is scientifically understood about the natural world, or on
mistaken, postulated notions about how nature works, is a matter of
some importance for the future.